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AbstrAct
Literature on opposition to regional integration has concen-
trated on the European Union (EU). So far, very few systematic 
attempts have been pursued to explain opposition to regional 
integration in Latin America or to identify its main influential 
factors. Based on Latinobarometer surveys, two main findings 
emerge from this paper. First, it confirms that opposition to 
regional integration is not a generalised attitude among Latin 
Americans. Secondly, the way in which citizens across Latin Ame-
rica evaluate regional integration is strongly influenced by the 
same predictors as in the EU. Together, citizens’ assessments of 
economic performance (both at the individual and national level) 
enjoy a preponderance to account for their position regarding 
regionalism. Others variables, i.e. age, ideological position, and 
level of education have a more limited explanatory value while 
occupation is not significant. Thus, economic variables such as 
citizens’ perceptions of their national and individual economy 
have proven to be directly linked to support for/opposition to 
economic integration.
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resumen
La literatura sobre la oposición a la integración regional se ha 
centrado en la Unión Europea (UE). Muy pocos han sido los 
intentos para explicar la oposición a la integración en América 
Latina o para identificar los factores que la influyen. Este estu-
dio está basado en encuestas Latinobarómetro, y produce dos 
hallazgos principales. Confirma que la oposición a la integración 
regional no es una actitud generalizada entre los latinoamerica-
nos. Y la forma en que los ciudadanos de América Latina evalúan 
la integración regional está fuertemente influenciada por los 
mismos predictores que en la UE. Las evaluaciones de los ciuda-
danos sobre el desempeño económico, tanto a nivel individual 
como nacional, gozan de una preponderancia para dar cuenta 
de la opinión relativa al regionalismo. Otras variables, como la 
edad, la posición ideológica y el nivel de educación, tienen un 
valor explicativo más limitado, mientras que la ocupación no 
es significativa. De esta manera, las variables económicas, como 
la percepción de los ciudadanos sobre su economía nacional 
e individual, han demostrado estar directamente vinculadas al 
apoyo/oposición a la integración económica.
Palabras clave: Integración regional – Opinión pública – Opo-
sición – América Latina.
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Introduction
Outside Europe, nowhere but in Latin 
America have integration attempts and 
thinking developed so extensively across 
space and so consistently over time1. After 
the Second World War, Latin American 
efforts at regionalism have been pursued 
through different waves. The most recent 
one, post-liberal or post-hegemonic 
regionalism, is now being dismantled, 
after a decade coexisting with projects 
like the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur) or the Andean Communi-
ty and seeing how the Pacific Alliance 
gains momentum.
In this particular context, it is more 
important than ever to study the oppo-
sition to regional integration and their 
implications. The study of opposition 
to regional integration is relevant not 
only due to its political implications 
but also because it helps explain citi-
zens’ basic ways of thinking about it. 
Indeed, such analysis can shed light on 
the integration process as such as well 
as on the dissenting actors.
This research relies on quanti-
tative methods and a comparative 
framework. Comparative integra-
tion studies are as old as integration 
1 Note that regionalism can be seen as an 
umbrella concept, covering a multiplicity 
of distinct phenomena. Hurrell (1995) enu-
merates five of these, arguing that none 
should be given the exclusive use of the 
term: regionalization; regional awareness 
and identity, regional interstate coopera-
tion; state-promoted regional integration; 
and regional cohesion. Thus, regional inte-
gration is perceived as a type of regionalism. 
projects. European Union (EU) studies 
emerged from the efforts of intellec-
tuals who used the European case as 
a basis to develop a general theory of 
regional integration. In addition, inte-
gration theory arrived in Latin America 
through the impulse of these very same 
neofunctionalist scholars such as E. Haas 
and P. Schmitter who first developed 
grand theories of the integration process 
in Europe (Malamud, 2010; Warleigh-Lack 
and Rosamond, 2010).
Such a comparative framework has 
great methodological benefits because 
it liberates from the “N=1” problem, par-
ticularly infamous among EU scholars 
who tend to be parochially European 
in their focus (Warleigh-Lack and Ro-
samond, 2010). We will therefore bene-
fit by using the European experience in 
comparative regional integration studies 
but by using the Latin American case to 
nuance hypothesis developed exclusively 
in the EU case so far.
Until now, the literature on resis-
tance to regional integration has con-
centrated on the EU. Research has 
developed exponentially in order to 
understand and explain the variety of 
attitudes of actors towards integration 
but with an exclusive EU focus. This is 
not surprising since the EU is the most 
institutionalized case of regional inte-
gration and the one that engendered 
complex and highly visible opposi-
tions at both the mass and elite levels.
However, so far, very few systematic 
attempts have been pursued to study 
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opposition or resistance to regional 
integration in Latin America. This 
should not come as a surprise at least 
for three reasons. First, Latin American 
regionalism is mainly an elite-driven 
or top-down phenomenon relying on 
both a generally positive opinion at 
the mass level and a quasi-monolithic 
pro-integration propensity among po-
litical elites which incarnates a type of 
intergovernmentalism, “interpresiden-
tialism” (Malamud 2003). Second, low 
rates of mobilization are found on re-
gional integration issues compared to 
other policy issues2; and finally, public 
opinion surveys have not developed 
extensively in the region.
It is acceptable to claim that Europe 
and other regions are not ‘comparable’ 
and therefore require different concepts 
and frameworks. Indeed, comparing 
the EU with other forms of regionalism 
highlights the difficulty faced by scholars 
when moving across the divide separat-
ing advanced industrial states from de-
veloping countries/emerging economies 
(Söderbaum 2013).
Too often regional specialization 
tends to lead scholars to develop con-
ceptual toolboxes and theories that 
are developed from/for their own ‘re-
gion’, without really trying to engage 
2 Over the years, there have been demonstra-
tions against potential multilateral trade 
agreements–especially in sectors such as 
agriculture, labor unions and other social 
organizations. Nevertheless, we are not 
interested in studying the opposition to 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) but to 
regional schemes.
other cases or competing discourses. 
Such parochialism prevents the devel-
opment of a more general and univer-
sal discourse. It prevents scholars from 
recognizing that they may be analyzing 
similar phenomena but with different 
languages and conceptualizations in 
different regions (Söderbaum, 2013).
Nonetheless, a comparison between 
the European and the Latin American 
cases can be particularly fruitful to have 
an in-depth understanding of the resis-
tances engendered by regional integra-
tion and of their consequences for the 
legitimacy of the integration process 
despite the substantial differences in 
historical experiences, social and eco-
nomic structures, geo-strategic location 
and political regimes. Indeed, although 
each case of regional integration is ob-
viously different in terms of institutional-
ization, context and political culture, such 
differences are usually exaggerated and 
do not in themselves preclude compara-
tive analysis (Söderbaum, 2009). Finally, as 
noted by A. Malamud (2010), Latin Amer-
ica has been an interesting laboratory for 
scholars on regionalism to test hypotheses 
drawn from the European experience on 
various issues.
Thus, as correctly pointed out by 
Breslin and Higgott, “when conducted 
properly, the comparative approach is 
an excellent tool … it is a key mech-
anism for bringing area studies and 
disciplinary studies together, and en-
hancing both. It provides new ways 
of thinking about the case studies 
whilst at the same time allowing for 
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the theories to be tested, adapted and 
advanced” (2000: 341).
This article examines the opposition 
to regional economic integration among 
public opinion in Latin America. Our ap-
proach is different from standard litera-
ture on public opinion since we tackle 
the question from a rather “negative” per-
spective: we focus on opposition and not 
support. The reason for this theoretical 
and methodological choice is connected 
to the fact that while regional integration 
projects continue to be largely elite-driven, 
“in democracies, public opinion can count 
a great deal, and a strong opposition to in-
tegration might well spell the end of the 
regionalist movement in Latin America” 
(Seligson, 1999: 130). In times when Latin 
American regionalism is complex, at times 
contradictory and even chaotic (Van Kla-
veren, 2018), it is clear that the probability 
that Latin American governments will 
move forward or turn their backs on the 
integrationist project depends today far 
more on public opinion than it did in the 
authoritarian past (Seligson, 1999).
Therefore, we prefer an approach 
that emphasizes the opposition 
dimension of public attitudes toward 
integration. Since different assump-
tions may be chosen to illuminate dif-
ferent aspects of mass attitudes vis-à-
vis regional integration, however, the 
two perspectives —support and oppo-
sition— and their concomitant narra-
tives are complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive.
The remainder of this article pro-
ceeds as follows: in the first section, it 
briefly discusses some basics about Eu-
roscepticism/opposition within the field 
of EU studies and political science. It 
continues by offering a synopsis of the 
(rather scarce) literature on Latin Amer-
ican public opinion on regional inte-
gration. The third section develops the 
analytical framework to apply to the 
Latin American case and the subsequent 
section presents a succinct appraisal of 
the determinants of public opinion vis-
à-vis regional integration based on the 
vast EU literature. This is followed by 
a presentation of hypotheses, data and 
methods. Next, the article introduces 
the results from our study, whereas the 
final section offers some conclusions.
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Some basics about Euroscepticism/opposition to the 
European integration process
Opposition to the European integra-
tion process has been a marginal and 
even a “taboo” issue for scholars. Histo-
riography of European integration has 
overlooked manifestations of conflict 
and little attention has been devoted to 
political and social resistances to EU in-
tegration within and beyond national 
states (Crespy and Verschueren, 2009). 
Of course, the failure of the Europe-
an Defense Community or the ‘empty 
chair crisis’, for example, appeared in 
books devoted to the history of Eu-
ropean integration. But overall “The 
federalist narrative, which dominated 
the European historiography from the 
1940s to the 1970s, generated a linear 
and finalist history of European inte-
gration. This historical lecture tended 
to play down conflicts and breakdowns 
while over-emphasizing the continuity 
of integration through a functionalist 
perspective” (Crespy and Verschueren, 
2009: 379)3.
Indeed, European integration was 
studied almost exclusively by Euro-
philes. During the first decades of its 
existence, opponents to the Europe-
an project were understood by most 
of those studying European integra-
tion simply to be “on the wrong side of 
3 “But the social and political forces carrying 
resistances to integration are not conside-
red and there is no reference book which 
tackles the issue with a broad perspective” 
(Crespy and Verschueren, 2009: 380).
history”, and therefore of little impor-
tance as objects of study (Katz, 2008: 
152).
However, many scholars have em-
braced the assumption that the debates 
over the Maastricht treaty in the 1990s 
have triggered the end of a ‘permissive 
consensus’ which had so far prevailed 
(Lindberg and Steingold, 1970). The 
broad picture is that the end of the 
‘permissive consensus’  —the historical 
elite consensus over Europe was in fa-
vor of European integration and public 
opinion was quiescent— has given rise 
to a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2008).
The change in mood towards Eu-
ropean integration that occurred in 
many EU countries during the 1990s 
and 2000s was labelled as ‘Euroscep-
ticism’. The term Euroscepticism is a 
catchall generic label for negative atti-
tudes to the EU. As Flood argues, “Euro-
scepticism remains a somewhat elusive 
phenomenon with unclear contours 
and borderlines” (Flood, 2002: 2): it can 
be used to refer “to Greek communists, 
Hungarian neo-Nazis, Dutch Christian 
conservatives, Greens, farmers, workers 
and even national institutions” (Leruth, 
Startin and Usherwood, 2018: 4). This 
diversity reflects the absence of a com-
monly agreed definition of Euroscep-
ticism. Even the terms that intend to 
play as synonyms are debatable.
Euroscepticism has proven high-
ly elusive. First, Euroscepticism is 
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a dynamic phenomenon, which 
makes it difficult to apprehend: it has 
changed over time as it has evolved 
with the integration process itself 
(Leconte, 2010: 4). Second, numerous 
actors may manifest Euroscepticism: 
citizens, political parties, the media, 
national institutions and civil society. 
The phenomenon can be studied from 
different perspectives, depending on 
which actor one places the focus on. 
For instance, there is an important 
body of literature on Euroscepticism 
in public opinion (Franklin et al., 1995; 
McLaren, 2006, among others).
Studies on the opposition to Euro-
pean integration, however, have not 
defined or characterized the object 
of that opposition. Most of the litera-
ture has excluded the question of what 
kind of actor the EU is (or wants to be) 
on which Euroscepticism revolves. In 
other words, we can ask what “oppo-
sition to Europe” means.
The notion of Euroscepticism is 
rather incompatible with an exer-
cise of comparison with the Latin 
American experience. The literature 
linked to opposition or dissatisfaction 
with European integration is exclu-
sively connected to the EU and their 
conceptual frameworks have no inten-
tion to be applied in other contexts.
However, what might be missing 
here is the possibility to distinguish 
between different moments in the 
process of European integration. As 
we have noted, Euroscepticism never 
stands still. Focusing on its dynamic 
nature, opposition to European inte-
gration has evolved in parallel to the 
process itself.
Thus, one can argue that the mean-
ing of Euroscepticism varies across 
time (Leconte, 2010), as the policy 
agenda changes (Hix, 2007). In this 
sense, opposition to regional integra-
tion in Latin America could mirror 
the hostility to the European project 
in its first stages, when the project was 
an economic enterprise aiming at inte-
grating markets through trade liberal-
ization and free movement of factors 
of production.
Reviewing the (scarce) Latin American literature
Most of the literature devoted to Latin 
American regionalism stresses the role of 
pro-integration forces and relativizes the 
voices of opposition. According to Rivaro-
la Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz, “Despite 
the hurdles, integration remains a firm is-
sue in the official agenda of Latin Ameri-
can countries, and regardless of ideological 
divisions, no government rejects the inte-
gration idea” (2013: 3).
Some authors acknowledge the 
resistance to pursuing further inte-
gration as an important feature of 
the internal political debates in each 
country —in some cases fearing the 
hegemonic role of Brazil, in others 
trying to avoid a linkage to any kind 
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of supranational dimension or diver-
sion of international trade (Rivaro-
la Puntigliano, 2013)—. However, in 
general, the literature tends to ignore 
opposition.
With the exception of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (naFta) 
and the Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas (Ftaa) initiative, the role of public 
opinion in regional economic schemes 
has been largely devoid of study in the 
region. Latin Americans’ support of/op-
position to integration has not been sub-
stantially explored especially in terms 
of multivariate analysis. Some rare ex-
ceptions are Seligson (1999), Jara Ibarra 
(2014) and Deutschmann and Minkus 
(2018). Seligson (1999) examined sup-
port for economic regional integration 
in seventeen Latin American countries 
using only 1996 Latinobarometer data 
and identified a range of micro-level 
predictors. His article, however, is now 
obsolete. The first attempt to assess fac-
tors that affect Latin American people’s 
opinions on regional integration was 
conducted by Jara Ibarra (2014), who ap-
plied multilevel models to 2009 Latino-
barometer data. However, by looking at 
only one point in time, the study is not 
able to discern any longitudinal trends 
(Deutschmann and Minkus, 2018).
As Deutschmann and Minkus (2018) 
correctly point out, other studies are 
limited to specific countries: Davis, Ga-
bel and Coleman (1998) studied public 
support for Central American integra-
tion in Costa Rica and El Salvador; Es-
trades (2006) examined support for Mer-
cosur among Uruguayans, and Stiller 
Titchener (2010) scrutinized Bolivians’ 
attitudes toward cooperation with 
neighboring countries and knowledge 
of regional integration efforts.
The application of time series analysis 
has brought this literature a significant 
step forward, especially through techni-
cal studies conducted by the Institute for 
the Integration of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (intal in Spanish) of the In-
ter-American Development Bank (idb) 
in association with Latinobarometer. For 
example, Barral Verna, Basco and Garne-
ro (2020) analyzed the opinion of Latin 
American citizens in relation to support 
for political integration, democracy, and 
its institutions, based on the 2018 Latinoba-
rometer survey. The document also took 
into account the results of surveys from 
previous years and correlated them with 
objective indicators.
Instead of focusing on a particular 
country or a small amount of surveys, our 
longitudinal analysis includes all coun-
tries and each and every one of the Latino-
barometer surveys where the integration 
question was incorporated. In this sense, 
this research adds to the still limited lit-
erature on public opinion on regional-
ism in Latin America since, to the best 
of our knowledge, no previous study has 
attempted to cover this lengthy period of 
time. Even if Deutschmann and Minkus’ 
study (2018) gathers 106,590 respondents, 
we have recorded 147,294 observations 
from the first 1995 Latinobarometer to 
the last one in 2018, which makes it in the 
largest study on Latin American public 
opinion on regionalism so far.
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As we point out below, there are some 
important shortcomings associated with 
the use of Latinobarometer surveys. The 
Latinobarometer lacks three years: 1999, 
2012 and 2014, and unlike Eurobarometer, 
not all standard questions in the Latino-
barometer recur over long periods of time. 
The question about popular support for 
integration in Latin America disappears 
from the questionnaire in several surveys. 
Even acknowledging this important gap 
a longitudinal study was chosen to obtain 
further comprehensive information and 
avoid the constraints and weaknesses of 
looking at one individual survey.
Analytical Framework
Integration processes in Latin America 
are mainly free trade endeavors: a clear 
preference for intergovernmentalism and 
low levels of institutionalization, as well 
as for preserving sovereignty and autono-
my in the national realm. Latin American 
integration governance is driven by col-
lective intergovernmental presidentialism. 
“These features are independent of ideo-
logical cleavages, national leaderships, and 
political cycles” (Sanahuja, 2017: 118).
Latin American governments have fo-
cused only in establishing an economic 
interregional interchange “whereas public 
opinion has been completely neglected” 
(Manenteau-Horta 1979 as cited in Jara 
Ibarra, 2014: 38). Although as from the 
2000s the integration process debate has 
gone beyond the economic dimension to 
include social issues —especially in the 
Southern Cone—, the latter still require 
further elaboration and presence within 
both the political and the academic dis-
cussion in Latin America.
We start out with the basic argument that 
in the case of Latin American regionalism 
it is not an increase in the authority that 
generates controversiality (De Wilde and 
Zürn, 2012), but rather the governments’ 
attempts to open national markets and 
liberalize international trade. This is so 
since in the Latin American case there is 
no such a move from a market integra-
tion project to a political union as in the 
EU. Region-building in Latin America is 
driven as much by political as economic 
factors although “issues of trade and in-
vestment appear to dominate the policy 
agenda” (Grugel, 2006: 215).
As we have appreciated in section I, 
the notions of Euroscepticism do not 
suit the parameters for a comparative 
exercise. The complexity of the EU sys-
tem and its policies add to this chal-
lenge. What might be missing here is 
the possibility to distinguish between 
different moments in the process of Eu-
ropean integration. As we have noted 
earlier, focusing on its dynamic nature, 
opposition to European integration has 
evolved in parallel to the process itself.
Resistance to the project of the 
common market in the 1950s is not 
comparable to the opposition to 
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political integration (with an EU citizen-
ship, a common currency and a common 
foreign and defense policy) embodied 
in the Maastricht treaty in the 1990s. In 
the first period, hostility to the European 
project was expressed either because inte-
gration was regarded as a capitalist proj-
ect –where member states were obliged 
to liberalize their markets and open up 
to capital mobility– and/or because it was 
seen as being incompatible with national 
sovereignty (Leconte, 2010).
In this sense, opposition to region-
al integration in Latin America could 
mirror the criticism to the European 
project in its first stages, when the proj-
ect was an economic enterprise aiming 
at integrating markets through trade 
liberalization and free movement of 
factors of production. Since integra-
tion processes in Latin America have 
not evolved towards supranationality 
or other complex forms of governance, 
we can consider them as economic en-
deavors with practically unchanging 
goals, unlike the EU. Thus, in the Latin 
American case, we focus on opposition 
to economic integration.
We avoid looking into the prin-
ciples upon which the integration 
process is based, the government or 
its policies on the integration realm. 
Rather, we focus on the integration 
process as a whole. In particular, this 
article examines the opposition to re-
gional economic integration in Latin 
America among public opinion and, 
more importantly, the factors that can 
be identified to determine citizens’ at-
titudes towards it. Importantly, it was 
not possible to investigate public sup-
port for each sub regional scheme in 
Latin America. Instead, the analysis 
was based upon the generic notion of 
“economic integration”4.
4 Note that 2008, 2009, 2010, 2016 and 2018 
Latinobarometer surveys not only ask inter-
viewees about their attitudes on economic 
integration, but also on political coopera-
tion or political integration among Latin 
American countries. This last question was 
excluded from our analysis in order to 
maintain its homogeneity and coherence. 
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Predictors of public opinion vis-à-vis regional 
integration
Public opinion plays a prominent role 
in political contestation over the EU. 
Even if neglected for decades when 
a ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg 
and Scheingold, 1970) prevailed, pub-
lic opinion started to manifest dis-
approval over European integration 
and a ‘constraining dissensus’ emerged 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2008), as we have 
noted above. In particular, the 1992 re-
jection by Danish voters of the Maas-
tricht treaty showed that without 
public support, progress on the inte-
gration process could be suspended or 
even reversed (Seligson, 1999).
Empirical research has shown main-
ly four factors influencing the develop-
ment of opposition attitudes towards 
European integration: cost-benefit 
analysis of EU accession and mem-
bership —the utilitarian factors, fear 
of the impact of the integration upon 
the national identity— the identity 
factors, distrust in the supra-national 
institutions and the perceived threats 
to national sovereignty —the political 
factors and hostility towards the cul-
tural and societal model of the EU— 
the cultural factors (Leconte, 2010; Mc-
Laren, 2006, 2007; Gabel, 1998; Gabel 
and Palmer, 1995).
From a utilitarian perspective, ge-
neric support for European integra-
tion is determined by a rational cost–
benefit analysis: those who benefit 
economically from European integra-
tion (particularly trade liberalization) 
are supportive, whereas those who 
stand to lose are more hostile (Gabel 
and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998; McLar-
en, 2006). In fact, utilitarian theory is 
reliant on self-interested or macro ex-
planations of political attitudes, and 
suggests that citizens are more likely 
to support integration if it results in 
a net benefit to the national economy 
or to their own pockets (Eichenberg 
and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998; Gabel 
and Palmer, 1995).
Gabel and Whitten (1997) mea-
sured integration support by taking 
two sets of economic indicators as in-
dependent variables, objective macro-
economic variables such as inflation, 
unemployment and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) –which had already 
been included in previous models, 
such as those of Eichenberg and Dal-
ton (1993)– and variables that measure 
citizens’ subjective perceptions of the 
economy, such as perception of their 
individual economic situation and 
their country’s economic situation.
Interestingly, the results of the 
study show that subjective economic 
variables have more weight in explain-
ing EU support than objective ones. 
The bottom line is that the more sat-
isfied citizens are with regard to their 
personal situation and the situation in 
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their country, the more they will sup-
port the integration process.5
Studies of support for the euro 
have also found that sociotropic eco-
nomic concerns play a role: citizens 
in countries that benefit economica-
lly, or are perceived to benefit econo-
mically, from membership of the EU 
are supportive of the euro (Hobolt 
and Wratil, 2015). Meanwhile, the Euro 
crisis has prompted Europeans to re-
consider their attitudes towards the 
EU and the integration process from 
a utilitarian perspective (Bargaoanu, 
Radu and Negrea-Busuioc, 2016).
According to Hooghe and Marks 
(2004), most researchers have con-
ceptualized European integration as 
an economic phenomenon: citizens 
evaluate the economic consequences 
of European integration for themsel-
ves and for the groups of which they 
are part. Nonetheless, the EU is also a 
supranational polity and it is plausi-
ble that European integration enga-
ges national identities. These authors 
postulate that economic interest va-
riables account for 15 per cent of total 
variance in public opinion regarding 
the EU but the influence of these fac-
tors is overshadowed by identity va-
riables, i.e. exclusive national identity, 
5 Theories of public opinion derived from 
individual egocentric calculation have been 
extended in two directions. First, subjective 
as well as objective factors have been taken 
into account. Second, sociotropic evalua-
tions concerning one’s group (in this case, 
country) can be theorized alongside egocen-
tric evaluations (Hooghe and Marks, 2005).
multiculturalism, and national attach-
ment. Together, these variables explain 
20.8 per cent of support for the EU 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2004).
In this paper we do not consider 
the explanation for the variation in su-
pport for/opposition to European in-
tegration which focuses on the threat 
that European integration can pose to 
national identity and a country’s sym-
bols and values (Hooghe and Marks, 
2004; McLaren, 2006) but on socioe-
conomic factors.
Regarding education, individuals 
with higher levels of education are 
more likely to support integration 
because they are better positioned to 
take advantage of market liberaliza-
tion (Gabel, 1998). Meanwhile, diffe-
rent occupational categories would 
vary in their opinion towards inte-
gration. Liberalized labor markets in-
troduce greater competition that can 
favor some occupations (those with 
adaptable skills) over others (Gabel, 
1998). For example, executives and 
other white-collar professionals are 
more likely to support integration 
than manual workers because they 
are more likely to be mobile between 
different industries and sectors (Gen-
na, 2009).
As to income, wealthier indivi-
duals are more likely to support inte-
gration because capital liberalization 
will allow them to exploit more in-
vestment opportunities (Gabel, 1998). 
Lower income earners are less likely 
to support integration because greater 
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capital mobility will lessen their bar-
gaining power (Gabel, 1998).
Age, measured in years, is included 
in the regular set of demographic va-
riables found in surveys. Age would 
measure the level of flexibility. Older 
respondents can be less flexible and 
therefore less supportive of new ideas 
such as European integration (Gen-
na, 2009).
Political orientation constitutes 
another major determinant of support 
for integration (Gabel, 1998). In rela-
tion to European integration, Ingle-
hart, Rabier and Reif (1987) showed 
that right-wing voters were more su-
pportive of the then European Com-
munity than were left-wing voters, 
while Gabel (1998) demonstrated 
that respondents who identified with 
a proletariat party were less supportive 
of integration than those identifying 
with a bourgeois party.
Hypotheses
As we have established before, Latin 
America has been an interesting la-
boratory for scholars on regionalism 
to test hypotheses drawn from the Eu-
ropean experience on various issues. 
We will then gain benefits by using 
the Latin American case to nuance 
hypothesis developed exclusively in 
the EU case so far.
As we have noted earlier, subjective 
economic evaluations can be expected 
to influence public opinion on Euro-
pean integration alongside objective 
factors. European integration is per-
ceived by most citizens to shape their 
economic welfare in a general sen-
se. Citizens who feel confident about 
the economic future –personally and 
for their country– are likely to regard 
European integration in a positive li-
ght, while those who are fearful will 
lean towards Euroscepticism (perso-
nal economic prospects and national 
economic prospects) (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2005). Citizens may be sensi-
tive to their sociotropic or collective 
economic circumstances, as well as to 
those that affect them individually. In 
short, support is given when indivi-
duals have favorable egocentric and/or 
national sociotropic evaluations despi-
te objective economic trends.
• Hypothesis 1: Those who feel 
that their national economy is 
not doing well, and that they 
personally are not doing well 
economically, are less supportive 
of integration.
We also include background varia-
bles that have proven to be of relevan-
ce to support for European integration, 
such as an individual’s level of edu-
cational attainment, occupation and 
socio-economic position. Immediate 
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pocketbook issues clearly have their 
impact on support of integration, but 
underlying socio-economic and de-
mographic issues play a role as well. 
The human capital hypothesis (Ga-
bel, 1998) suggests that less educated 
people are more skeptical towards the 
EU6. In Europe, those with higher ed-
ucation are all more supportive of in-
tegration than those with lower edu-
cation. A potential mechanism behind 
this pattern was proposed by Inglehart 
(1970a), who argued that “cognitive mo-
bilization” that comes with higher edu-
cation increases support for European 
integration. Seligson (1999) found that 
education clearly stratified support for 
Latin American economic integration, 
with the least educated being least fa-
vorable. Similar findings have been re-
ported for support for political inte-
gration in the region (Jara Ibarra, 2014).
• Hypothesis 2: Those with lower 
levels of education are less 
supportive of regional integration 
than those who have completed 
university degrees.
Utilitarian models distinguish be-
tween ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of integra-
tion and suggest that education and 
6  Gabel (1998) claims that liberalization 
increases the value of the assets possessed 
by those with higher incomes and higher 
levels of education. Thus, citizens who pos-
sess high levels of ‘human capital’ (econo-
mic assets and education) are less likely to 
be anti-European than citizens with lower 
levels of human capital.
skills may influence the level of sup-
port for the EU. Privileged people are 
expected to be more favorable to Euro-
pean integration than lower strata cate-
gories since the former have better op-
portunities to act in the international 
setting (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). Highly 
qualified citizens are more resilient in the 
EU’s neo-liberal economic environment. 
Citizens with lower or no skill sets find 
themselves increasingly excluded from 
full labor market participation. In a sim-
plified assumption, we expect unskilled 
workers to be against integration and 
managers or professionals to be support-
ive. Research in Europe has often found 
that professionals are more supportive 
of integration than blue-collar workers 
(Seligson, 1999).
• Hypothesis 3: Among those 
with the lowest level professional 
occupations, support is lower 
than among higher-level 
professional occupations.
The last socio-economic variable 
linked to support for integration is 
wealth. Some EU studies find that well-
off —as well as more highly educated 
and highly skilled— citizens are much 
more likely to favor European integra-
tion than Europeans with lower in-
comes —and lower levels of educational 
attainment and those who work in the 
manual, lower-skilled professions—. In 
particular, studies show that income is 
likely to affect positive attitudes towards 
the EU (Guerra, 2018).
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• Hypothesis 4: Those whose 
socio-economic level is higher 
are supportive of integration 
whilst those whose level is lower 
tend to be against it.
Studies show that age groups can 
show different patterns across member 
states, but young people are generally 
more positive towards the EU integra-
tion process (Inglehart, 1970b; Gabel, 
1998). However, we do not expect a uni-
form picture concerning this association. 
High expectations and low deliveries, 
or persisting pockets of poverty, can af-
fect attitudes when the EU is mostly 
perceived as an economic organization 
(Guerra, 2018). The EU can represent 
economic benefits at the country and 
personal levels, but when expectations 
meet low delivery, the costs of long-term 
recession can impact on young citizens’ 
attitudes and disengage them from the 
EU integration project (Guerra, 2018).
• Hypothesis 5: Those who are 
younger are less supportive than 
older people.
The left–right dimension is an endur-
ing marker of ideological positions and 
continues to structure political choice 
in domestic politics in Europe. There is 
a link between left–right self-placement 
and attitudes towards Europe. While 
left-right ideology remains a powerful 
factor in how Europeans view key poli-
cy questions, the evidence has not been 
consistent. For some, right-wing people 
are more supportive of the EU since they 
expect profits from European integra-
tion owing to liberal market policies 
(Deflem and Pampel, 1996). As for Latin 
America, Magaloni and Romero (2008) 
showed that voters of left-wing parties 
were less supportive of free trade in the 
1990s. A note of caution is due here 
since in contrast to these earlier find-
ings, Jara Ibarra (2014) found that in 2009, 
left-wing Latin Americans were more 
supportive of both economic and po-
litical integration than the right. More 
information on left-right self-placement 
would help us to establish a greater de-
gree of accuracy on this matter.
• Hypothesis 6: Those who tend to 
align with left-leaning parties are 
less supportive than those who 
identify with traditional parties 
on the right or center.
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Methodology and Data
As we set out to examine the alleged 
opposition to Latin American region-
al integration processes, we need to de-
cide on what type of data to gather in 
order to test the hypotheses outlined 
above. Within the region, revealing 
information can be found in Latinoba-
rometer reports. The Latinobarometer, 
modelled after the Eurobarometer on 
which so much European research has 
been based, covers all of the mainland 
countries from Mexico to the tip of 
South America, with the exception of 
Belize, Surinam and the Guianas.
Opposition to regional integration 
can be operationalized using a variety 
of different measures. Latinobarome-
ter database was used for carrying out 
this study. We have used thirteen of 
the available surveys on the Latino-
barometer official webpage, from the 
first survey to the last one up to the 
present (covering the period 1995-2018), 
which constitutes the largest longitu-
dinal study on the issue to date, to the 
best of our knowledge.
We rely on the “economic integration” 
question, which asks respondents if they 
are in favor of, or against, the economic in-
tegration of the countries of Latin Amer-
ica. This question maps whether citizens 
hold positive or negative views of regional 
(economic) integration. Individuals are 
able to choose their position on a four-
point scale ranging from “very in favor” 
(1) to “very against” (4). From the first 1995 
Latinobarometer to the last one in 2018 we 
have recorded 147,294 observations.
There are some drawbacks, none-
theless, associated with the use of Lati-
nobarometer surveys. First, the Latino-
barometer lacks three years: 1999, 2012 
and 2014. Second, unlike Eurobarom-
eter, not all standard questions in the 
Latinobarometer recur over long peri-
ods of time. Even if Latinobarometer 
conducted several surveys about pop-
ular support for integration in Latin 
America, the question disappeared from 
the questionnaire in the 2000, 2003, 2004, 
2006, 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2015 surveys.
Third, in the surveys that included 
this question, the choices for the respon-
dents were slightly different from one 
survey to another. Sometimes it was 
formulated in these terms: “Are you in 
favor or against the integration of your 
country with other countries in the re-
gion?” In other surveys the question was 
“Are you very much in favor, somewhat 
in favor, somewhat against or very much 
against economic integration?”7.
Since changes in the wordings of ques-
tions make the comparability of the data 
across time and space problematic, we have 
recoded the main variable so that lower 
scores reflect more support for integration, 
while higher scores indicate greater oppo-
sition. We have conducted a logistic regres-
sion analysis on a recoded, dichotomous 
version of our variable. For the analysis we 
have distinguished between individuals 
holding positive views of integration 
7  The response option for the question was 
dualistic in the 1995 and 1996 surveys. 
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(scoring 1 and 2, here recoded as 0), 
and the rest of respondents (values 3 to 
4, here recoded as 1). The “Don’t know/ 
Don’t answer” (DK/DA) responses are 
excluded from the database so that the 
focus is on those who hold an opinion.
The data analysis then focuses on 
the factors that relate to higher or low-
er opposition to integration among 
Latin Americans, and concludes with 
a logistic regression analysis of those 
factors. Specifically this paper analy-
ses the impact of socio-economic and 
demographic variables (age, years of 
education, socio-economic situation8, 
and occupation), economic variables 
such as citizens’ perceptions of their 
national and individual economy, and 
political variables, which target here 
8 As in many surveys, the Latinobarometer 
did not ask directly about income since 
many respondents refuse to answer this 
question or provide a deceptive answer. A 
better measure of the respondent’s 
socio-economic level is obtained by the 
perception of the interviewer.
only an indicator of self-placement in 
a left–right ideology scale.9
Note that to incorporate the variables 
of interest in the model, a recoding was 
needed, since most of them were categori-
cal variables —not quantitative variables— 
and thus we draw on the creation of dum-
mies. Interestingly, in model 1 that considers 
all variables, the variable “occupation” was 
not significant; i.e., the interviewee’s occu-
pation did not interfere with the opinion 
she/he has about regional integration. Then, 
a new model —model 2— was set disre-
garding the occupation of the interviewee 
and all variables were significant. The results 
of the regression estimations are presented 
in Table 1.
9 Even though there have been several 
changes in the wordings of the questions, 
these are some examples of the questions 
that tackle our main variables. National 
economy: In general, how would you 
describe the present economic situation of 
the country? Would you say that it is very 
good, fairly good, about average, fairly bad, 
or very bad? Individual economy: In gen-
eral, how would you describe your present 
economic situation and that of your family? 
Would you say that it is very good, good, 
about average, bad or very bad? Education: 
Years in education of respondent, Occupa-
tion: Respondent actual occupation. Age. 
Socioeconomic level. Very good, good, aver-
age, bad, very bad. Ideology: In politics, 
people normally speak of ‘left’ and ‘right’. 
On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, 
where would you place yourself?
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Results
The data analyzed about the opinions of 
Latin American citizens demonstrate a 
generic support for integration as shown 
in previous research (e.g. Seligson, 1999). 
It is not surprising, however, that attitudes 
of public opinion towards integration 
has oscillated over time (Graph 1). Oppo-
sition hit the highest point in 1996 and 
it raised again in 1998 and 2005. However, 
opposition to economic integration has 
never reached the 25.5 per cent peak of 
1996 again. It is at the present time around 
15 per cent.
The most striking result to emerge 
from the data is that even though the 
experience with economic integration 
in Latin America is more limited than in 
the European case, the individual-level 
patterns we find in this analysis mirror 
closely those uncovered in Europe. The 
results show a strong relationship be-
tween Latin Americans’ perception of 
their country’s and their own econom-
ic situation and support for integration, 
which is clear from Table 1. Conversely, 
those most pessimistic about their per-
sonal and national economy are against 
integration. So, H1 can be confirmed.
Even though the search for the fac-
tors that explain these general fluctu-
ant trends are beyond the scope of 
this paper it is interesting to note that, 
Graph 1 Opposition/support economic integration in Latin America 
(1995–2018)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Latinobarometer
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surprisingly, the first years of open 
regionalism overlaps with a decrease 
in popular support while the super 
cycle of commodities coincides with 
negative attitudes towards regional 
economic integration in 2005. Also, 
our research shows that the 1998-2001 
economic crisis did not substantially 
bring economic factors back in as an 
important source of opposition to re-
gional integration.
The partial recovery of Latin American 
gdp at the end of 2010 has not significantly 
contributed to a revival of people’s trust 
in regional economic integration, which 
demonstrates again the gap between the 
reality presented by the economic indi-
cators and the reality experienced by the 
citizens of the member states. Thus, in-
dividual perceptions play an extremely 
important role in explaining public op-
position to integration in Latin Ameri-
ca. Subjective economic evaluations can 
be expected to influence public opinion 
on regional integration despite –and not 
alongside– objective factors.
Some trends, nonetheless, follow ex-
pected performances. Although the re-
gion made great strides over the period be-
tween the 2000s and mid-2010s in poverty 
eradication, setbacks have occurred since 
2015, particularly with regard to extreme 
Graph 2 Opposition/support for economic integration in Latin America 
and global economic trends (1995–2018)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Latinobarometer
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poverty (eclac, 2019). Income inequality 
decreased considerably in the region be-
tween 2002 and 2017, but the pace of this 
process has slowed in recent years (eclac, 
2019). The region’s poor performance in 
recent years, coupled with the weak eco-
nomic cycle, could —though roughly— 
explain a decrease in public support to 
economic integration.
Another way to perceive the same 
patterns is observing the evolution 
of gdp in Latin America and general 
attitudes towards economic integra-
tion among Latin American citizens 
(Graph 3).
To check the robustness of our 
findings, we have also conducted the 
analyses with other macroeconomic 
indicators, such as the GDP growth 
per capita. We receive similar results. 
The reason for this is that both macro-
economic indicators –GDP and GDP 
per capita– are highly correlated with 
each other (Graph 4).
The other socio-economic and de-
mographic variables shown in the 
regression analysis are significant 
predictors. Our study has identified 
systematic impact on individual-level 
opposition to integration of literacy 
(H2), socio-economic level (H4), age 
(H5) and ideology (H6). Results show 
a high correlation between those re-
spondents with lower levels of edu-
cation and whose socio-economic 
situation is bad and those criticizers 
Graph 3 General attitudes towards economic integration and Gross 
Domestic Product in Latin America (1995-2018)
Source: ECLAC, 2019 and author’s own statistics based on Latinobarometer surveys
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of integration. Also, those who are 
younger,10 and who are in the left of 
the political spectrum, are less sup-
portive of regional integration.
Overall, the stark differences pre-
dicted by the occupation theories (H3) 
are not present in these data. This re-
sult supports evidence from previous 
observations (Seligson, 1999): occu-
pation played only a small role (if at 
all) in determining support/opposi-
tion. It also reflect the results of Zi-
zumbo-Colunga and Seligson (1992) 
10 With regard to age, these results confirm 
that opposition to integration among 
young people prevails for economic inte-
gration as recent research has shown (Alva-
rez, 2020).
who found that there does not seem 
to be a clear skilled-unskilled divide 
in citizens’ attitude about economic 
endeavors, in their case, Ftas. The lack 
of an occupation effect is, perhaps, sur-
prising. Our view, however, is that this 
makes sense in relation to the domi-
nant importance of more direct expe-
riential variables such as the percep-
tion of individual economic situation 
or the country’s economic situation.
Graph 4 General attitudes towards economic integration and Per capita 
Gross Domestic Product in Latin America (1995–2018)
Source: ECLAC, 2019 and author’s own statistics based on Latinobarometer surveys
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Table 1 Determinants of public opinion on economic integration in Latin 
America
Model 1 Model 2




























< 2e-16 *** INDIV ECON 
SIT 3
< 2e-16 ***
RIGHT/LEFT 1 3.65e-09 *** RIGHT/LEFT 1 1.43e-08 ***
RIGHT/LEFT 5 < 2e-16 *** RIGHT/LEFT 5 < 2e-16 ***
EDUCATION 2 0.607409 EDUCATION 2 0.592513
EDUCATION 3 0.868391 EDUCATION 3 0.907137
EDUCATION 4 0.500283 EDUCATION 4 0.476648
EDUCATION 5 0.003464 ** EDUCATION 5 0.004304 **
EDUCATION 6 0.000719 *** EDUCATION 6 0.000942 ***
EDUCATION 7 3.92e-10 *** EDUCATION 7 6.22e-10 ***
EDUCATION 8 1.19e-07 *** EDUCATION 8 8.12e-08 ***
EDUCATION 9 2.04e-10 *** EDUCATION 9 9.36e-11 ***
EDUCATION 10 2.29e-09 *** EDUCATION 10 1.31e-09 ***
EDUCATION 11 1.68e-06 *** EDUCATION 11 1.16e-07 ***
EDUCATION 12 1.34e-11 *** EDUCATION 12 1.40e-12 ***
EDUCATION 13 < 2e-16 *** EDUCATION 13 < 2e-16 ***
EDUCATION 14 1.00e-13 *** EDUCATION 14 < 2e-16 ***
EDUCATION 15 < 2e-16 *** EDUCATION 15 < 2e-16 ***
EDUCATION 16 9.21e-11 *** EDUCATION 16 1.78e-12 ***
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EDUCATION 17 < 2e-16 *** EDUCATION 17 < 2e-16 ***
OCCUP2 0.224142 SOCIO-ECON 
LEV 2
0.795091
OCCUP3 0.071401 SOCIO-ECON 
LEV 3
0.000118 ***
OCCUP4 0.000794 *** SOCIO-ECON 
LEV 4
1.09e-08 ***
OCCUP5 0.581317 SOCIO-ECON 
LEV 5
6.34e-09 ***
OCCUP6 0.083996 AGE 3 3.52e-07 ***


















AGE < 2e-16 ***
YEAR < 2e-16 ***
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Latinobarometer surveys
Note: Ordered logistic regression 0‘***’/0.001 ‘**’/0.01 ‘*’/0.05 ‘.’/0.1 ‘’/1
In summary, these results suggest 
that those interviewed who consider 
that the economic situation in the 
country is bad, consider that their in-
dividual economic situation is bad, 
who are young and tend to vote for 
left parties, are expected to be opposed 
to economic integration. Those with 
a basic level of education, and whose 
socio-economic level is low are also 
less supportive.
Inversely, individuals that consider 
that the country economic situation 
is good, that their personal economic 
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situation is good, who are older, and 
who are in the center or right of the po-
litical spectrum, are significantly more 
supportive of regional integration. Also 
those who have higher average level of 
education (measured by years in school), 
with a very good socio-economic situa-
tion are more supportive.
Our study reveals that perceptions 
of economic individual situation ac-
count for 30 per cent –and of national 
economic situation for 24 per cent– 
of total variance in Latin American 
public opinion regarding regional 
integration. Together, these variables 
enjoys a preponderance to account 
for the position regarding regionalism. 
Others variables, i.e. age (20 per cent), 
ideological position (13 per cent), and 
level of education (13 per cent) have a 
more limited explanatory value. The-
se results agree with studies that have 
conceptualized European integration 
as an economic phenomenon, and the-
refore considered public opinion as a 
function of the distributional conse-
quences of market liberalization.
Conclusion
Regional integration schemes are not 
all the same. The differences between 
them are not ontological, but rather 
of degree – the degree of scope and 
depth of cooperation and integration, 
the degree of institutionalization, the 
degree of supranationality, and state of 
development. In Latin America, des-
pite national traditions of collective 
action, public mobilization is weaker.
Until now, the literature on oppo-
sition to regional integration has con-
centrated on the EU. There has not 
been much systematic research on at-
titudes towards regional integration 
in Latin America. We have benefited 
by using the Latin American case to 
nuance hypothesis developed exclusi-
vely in the EU case so far. After a brief 
review of the basics about Euroscep-
ticism/opposition to the EU, we argue 
that this notion is quite incompatible 
with an exercise of comparison with 
the Latin American experience. Con-
ceptual categories are exclusively con-
nected to the EU and have no inten-
tion to be applied in other regional 
contexts.
However, Euroscepticism might 
inform views of regional integration 
more generally, if focus is placed on its 
changing nature over time, recalling 
that the EU has been primarily an eco-
nomic project driven by the premise of 
creating a common market in goods, 
services, labor and capital. Political 
and economic integration might be 
differentiated and so is opposition to 
these dimensions.
The findings from this study intend 
to contribute to the current literature. 
Combining the information gleaned 
from the survey items analyzed, two 
main conclusions can be drawn. First, 
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we confirm that opposition to regio-
nal integration is not a generalized 
attitude among Latin Americans. Sta-
te-led, presidential-driven integration 
has been a persistent feature of Latin 
American integration, as has been the 
low level of involvement of citizenship.
Secondly, economic variables such 
as citizens’ perceptions of their natio-
nal and individual economy have pro-
ven to be directly linked to support 
for/opposition to economic integra-
tion. Interestingly, the results of the 
study show that subjective economic 
variables have more weight in explai-
ning public support than objective 
ones. This analysis ratifies that the 
utilitarian model, based on people’s 
perceptions, is the most explanatory 
factor in the Latin American case. The 
bottom line is that the more satisfied 
citizens are with regard to their perso-
nal situation and the situation in their 
country, the more they will support 
the integration process and vice versa.
The present study lays the ground 
for future research into other factors ra-
ther than utilitarian variables to explain 
opposition to regional integration in 
Latin America, such as identity-based 
arguments. The effect of identity and 
affective considerations on the public 
opinion of Latin American countries 
should be incorporated to move the 
debate forward. New and more speci-
fic questions need to be asked to better 
map different attitudes –and their cau-
ses– so that we have a fuller understan-
ding of the phenomenon.
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